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THE MAZE OF TASTE: ON BATAILLE, DERRIDA, 
AND KANT 
A rkady Plotnitsky 
University of Pennsylvania 
If Bataille's confrontation with Hegel can be seen as central to 
his thought and writing and has become a relative commonplace 
(albeit a productive one), Bataille's references to Kant are only 
casual. I shall not, however, argue the significance of Kant in 
Bataille's discourse in specific (let alone textual) terms. Rather, I 
want to explore what can be seen as a Kantian moment in Bataille, as 
it appears within the historical and conceptual closure that, accord- 
ing to Derrida, defines Western philosophical discourse, or 
theoretical discourse, or even discourse in general. Indeed it is far 
from self-evident that this closure can be subsumed under the rubric of 
the Occident, however convenient or comfortable that demarcation 
might appear. 
That Kant influenced Bataille is best illustrated by Bataille him- 
self in a passing remark in "The 'Old Mole' and the Prefix Sur in the 
words Surhomme [ Superman] and Surrealist": ". . . it was neces- 
s ary to endow antinomies in general with a mechanical and abstract 
character, as in Kant and Hegel."' This coupling of Kant and Hegel is 
familiar to the point of triviality. It is far less trivial and far more sig- 
nificant, however, that this coupling and this unity are, to a con- 
siderable degree, conceived of by Bataille in terms of a historical and 
conceptual closure of metaphysics, the closure on which our dis- 
course must depend, even when it is aimed at undermining the power 
of metaphysics and philosophy. 2 The concept of closure, further- 
more, includes a crucial idea of the necessity-psychological, social, 
cultural, historical, perhaps even political-of metaphysical think- 
ing. Indeed, the phrase immediately preceding the one just cited 
defines the philosophical closure of language: ". . . for human 
vocabulary continues everywhere to maintain throughout a faithful 
memory of fundamental categories" (Visions, p. 35). 
199 1
Plotnitsky: The Maze of Taste: On Bataille, Derrida, and Kant
Published by New Prairie Press
200 STCL, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Summer, 1988) 
With the exception of Derrida's seminal formulations, one can 
hardly think of a better invocation of closure: however much 
"philosophical usages are in question" ( Visions, p. 35) and however 
transformed they might become, the metaphysical remnants, 
including those left by the history of this questioning, are ineluctable 
in our language. It is this configuration that is powerfully explored by 
Derrida. The notion of closure, so conceived, is perhaps Derrida's 
most significant contribution to modern theoretical thought and to 
intellectual history in general. 
It is of course true that the very concept (or category) of category 
is itself a Kantian, as well as an Aristotelian one. The closure begins 
neither with Kant (nor Aristotle, nor anyone else), nor does it end with 
Hegel, Bataille, or Derrida. The title of Bataille's essay (accom- 
panied by its epigraph from Marx, metaphorically defining historical 
materialism: "In history as in nature decay is the laboratory of life" 
[Visions, p. 32]) announces this closure and the proper names that 
demarcate it in more recent historical terms: Marx, Nietzsche, Freud 
and several others as well. In doing so, Bataille's text inscribes "the 
historical and theoretical situation that is also our own" (Posi- 
tions, p. 51), simultaneously framing it-inscribing its "parergon- 
between the communist and surrealist manifestos."' 
These later parergonal structures still await an analysis at the 
level that their complexity and richness demand, whether we view 
them in a general context or see the locus of Bataille's discourse 
between Breton and Aragon-in, as it were, the Breton/Aragon parer- 
gon. It is not that this context or (for it can hardly be subsumed under 
the rubric of context), this configuration, can exhaust the parergon of 
Bataille's discourse. It can only provisionally open it. The parergon 
defining Bataille's discourse or, as Derrida persuasively argues, any 
parergon can neither be exhausted nor saturated. It can be neither 
uniquely originated, nor unequivocally closed. This is why these 
parergonal effects cannot be subsumed under the rubric of context, 
particularly conscious context.4 One of my goals in this essay will be 
to follow the complexity of the parergonal in the context (that is to say, 
parergon) of Bataille's discourse, specifically in relation to the ques- 
tion of general economy and of the major form of writing opened by 
B ataille. 
Undoubtedly, the shadow of Hegel looms large over all this, 
whether in Marx, Bataille, Derrida or in general. But Kant's shadow 
no less so. For, if "Hegel is always right as soon as one opens one's 2




mouth in order to articulate meaning," he cannot be right without 
Kant. s It is this Kantian margin (or center) that I want to explore, 
borrowing in part my title from Bataille's "The Labyrinth." This 
proximity of closure might, along the way, also suggest a certain 
textual proximity on which I shall not insist but which cannot be 
ignored either. 
There will be a further specificity, for my theme will be a very 
small but extraordinarily interesting and important portion of Kant's 
third critique. As in Bataille's essay cited earlier, the question of the 
philosophical will be situated in Kant between the question of the 
aesthetic (analogous to surrealism in Bataille) and the political. It is 
this "left" artistic margin that will be my major concern in this essay. 
As Bataille's "sur" suggests, this "margin"-that is, what is 
marginalized and minimized within the text of philosophy-will, in 
the power of its efficacy, exceed the "center" and will thus be re- 
inscribed as the condition of the possibility of the center. Kant already 
knew (or was afraid to know) that, suppressing the excess of knowl- 
edge that makes knowledge (i.e. philosophy) possible in the first 
place. My major concern however will be what Bataille manages to do 
with this "knowledge," for, as Derrida says, "We know this . . . only 
now, and with a knowledge that is not a knowledge at all."6 This is 
what Bataille had in mind or what we would do best to infer from his 
concept of un-knowledge. 
In establishing his division and, a bit later, his hierarchy of the 
beautiful arts, Kant writes of the arts of speech (of which poetry will 
be then specifically assigned "the first rank"): 
The orator, then, promises a serious business, and in order 
to entertain his audience conducts it as if it were a mere play with 
ideas. The poet merely promises an entertaining play with ideas, 
and yet it has the same effect upon the understanding as if he had 
only intended to carry on its business. The combination and 
harmony of both cognitive faculties, sensibility and understand- 
ing, which cannot dispense with each other but which yet cannot 
well be united without constraint and mutual prejudice, must 
appear to be undesigned and so to be brought about by them- 
selves; otherwise it is not beautiful art. Hence, all that is studied 
and anxious must be avoided in it, for beautiful art must be free 
art in a double sense. It is not a work like a mercenary employ- 
ment, the greatness of which can be judged according to a 3
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definite standard, which can be attained or paid for, and again, 
though the mind is here occupied, it feels itself thus contented and 
aroused without looking to any other purpose (independent of 
reward). 
The orator therefore gives something which he does not 
promise, viz. an entertaining play of the imagination; but he also 
fails to supply what he did promise, which is indeed his 
announced business, viz. the purposive occupation of the under- 
standing. On the other hand, the poet promises little and 
announces a mere play with ideas; but he supplies something 
which is worth occupying ourselves with, because he provides in 
this play food for the understanding and, by the aid of imagina- 
tion, gives life to his concepts. (Thus the orator on the whole 
gives less, the poet more, than he promises).' 
It might seem astonishing, but also, given the structure of clo- 
sure as delineated earlier, rather natural or logical, how much of 
Bataille's problematics is inscribed in this and surrounding passages 
in Kant. Given the transformations of the concepts of text and history 
enacted by the recent transformations of the theoretical field itself, 
including those in Bataille's text, one hesitates to use the word 
"anticipated." These transformations, specifically those inscribed in 
Bataille's text, affect our conception of what constitutes the 
theoretical field and how it is constituted as much as they affect the 
concepts of text and history. 
There is, to begin with, the question of "economy" in its most 
conventional sense, the economic question raised by Kant's concep- 
tion of beautiful art as free art (in the first sense). One might and 
indeed must see it as the question of political economy as well: it 
is hardly useful-"economical" or "productive"-to speak of an 
economy that would not be political in the context of Bataille, even as 
Bataille subjects the science of political economy and its concepts to a 
radical critique as a restricted economy. It is a far more complex ques- 
tion whether, while retaining the significance of the political and, at 
the same time, inscribing the general economy as an economy of 
waste and expenditure, Bataille avoids a certain idealization of waste 
as against consumption accounted for by a restricted economy. The 
latter in Bataille manifests itself precisely at the level of the classical 
science of political economy. 
Beautiful art, then, "is not a work like a mercenary employment, 4




the greatness of which can be judged according to a definite standard, 
which can be attained or paid for" (p. 165). Derrida was perhaps the 
first to draw attention to these "economic" connections in Kant in 
"Economimesis," expanding the general concept of economy as 
grounding the question of genius in its relation to the question of imita- 
tion. The imitative work of genius (with respect to Nature) is an imita- 
tion, mimesis, of economy as process, play of forces and so on- 
economimesis-not an imitation of the product. Genius in its crea- 
tion, in its production, imitates how Nature (or God) produces, not 
what is produced. Economic metaphors, including those of political 
economics, still permeate the philosophical account, the science of 
this "economy," expanded by Kant from a difference between beauti- 
ful art and a material ("hard") economic process, "a work like a mer- 
cenary employment," to a difference ( still economic) in the occupa- 
tion of the mind. Kant's "and again" is most telling in this respect: 
"And again, though the mind is here occupied [employed], it feels 
itself thus contented and aroused without looking to any other pur- 
pose (independently of reward)" (p. 165). 
Kant's borrowing, both negative and positive, of the economic 
inscriptions does not in itself constitute a problem, particularly if con- 
sidered in the context of Bataille's discourse. First of all, the dis- 
course of political economy might itself be seen, historically speaking, 
as borrowing from Kant in this respect, though it would be silly to see 
Kant's in turn as an original discourse in this sense. Kant must have 
borrowed his "mercenary" metaphors from some forms of economic 
and political economic discourse. There can be an original metaphor 
here no more than anywhere else. Second, the history of theory from 
Kant to Marx, Nietzsche, Freud and Bataille demonstrates that the 
metaphors of economy have proved to be as theoretically productive 
as they are unavoidable. Indeed, as Bataille's discourse shows with 
extraordinary power, it is the economic insistence on consumption at 
the multiple and often interacting levels of theoretical economies- 
economic, political, conceptual-that is most problematic. The 
theoretical problem is a metaphoric loss of the economy of loss and 
thus of the general economy. 
It is not that consumption and the pleasure of consumption are 
not important or theoretically and otherwise pleasurable. To reverse 
the configuration absolutely and to privilege expenditure uncondi- 
tionally would be just as untenable. As I indicated earlier, Bataille's 
heavy insistence on waste and expenditure must be seen as 5
Plotnitsky: The Maze of Taste: On Bataille, Derrida, and Kant
Published by New Prairie Press
204 STCL, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Summer, 1988) 
problematic in this respect, and is "saved" only by the enormous 
labyrinthine complexity of Bataille's inscription of these concepts. 
A considerable portion of the third critique might be seen as 
Kant's attempt at a science of this-non-economic-economy of the 
poet or genius, represented best by the genius of poetry, which "of all 
the arts . . . maintains the first rank." Or, closer to Bataille's terms, 
one might speak of economy as the science of this operation of genius, 
analogous to, but also different from, the sovereign operation as 
conceived by Bataille, requiring a major form of writing and a general 
rather than restricted economy as its science. Like Hegel's economy 
of Absolute Knowledge, the economy inscribed in Kant, being an 
economy of consumption, must still be seen as a restricted economy: 
the science of the operation of mastery rather than the general 
economy and sovereignty in Bataille. 8 
One might feel a certain uneasiness with regard to the metaphoric 
fusion, transfusion or, at times, a metaphoric confusion arising in 
these labyrinths of "economic" inscription in Kant, Bataille and 
Derrida. It is useful to keep in mind for clarity's sake that "economy" 
in Bataille always designates a science, a theory: in the most signifi- 
cant case, that of the general economy. It is a science of the sovereign 
operation, whereas in Derrida's reading of Kant, "economy" 
designates an operation, an activity of genius. In general terms, how- 
ever, particularly in those of general economy, the metaphorical trans- 
fusions of that type are as productive as they are inevitable. For it is 
our economies as sciences or theories- accounts -that produce the 
economies or operation we want to account for. The economic 
metaphor of accounting is, in turn, not accidental in this context. It is 
an accounting or calculation of certain operations, however endless or 
interminable, that we want to inscribe as calculus and accounting of 
the interminable and the indeterminable. 
Hegel in making the philosophy of history into the history of 
philosophy, already knew it quite well and was one of the first to 
understand the depths and labyrinths of this problem that can only be 
finally resolved at the level of the Absolute, that is to say, impossible 
knowledge. Derrida, in commenting on the transgression of Hegel 
enacted by Bataille's sovereignty, correctly points out the necessity of 
this Hegelian moment: "Not that one returns, in classical and pre - 
Hegelian fashion, to an ahistorical sense which would constitute a 
figure of the Phenomenology of Mind. Sovereignty transgresses the 6




entirety of the history of meaning and the entirety of the meaning of 
history, and the project of knowledge which has always obscurely 
welded these two together" ( Writing and Difference, p. 269). In his 
essay, Derrida also speaks of "the rigorous and subtle corridors" 
(p. 254) of dialectic. Quite so, yet corridors of dialectics are not the 
labyrinths of the general economy. Life in the labyrinth may not be 
easy; it is, however, preferable to life in a more comfortable corridor. 
(Nobody any longer even dreams about rooms, let alone apartments 
or houses. Well, some do.) 
That is not to say, particularly given the labyrinths of our 
theoretical household (in Greek, oikonomia, economy), that our 
accounting will be able to comprehend everything- "to take every- 
thing into account." That would still be an illusion, however com- 
fortable, a dialectical corridor-that is, a restricted economy, whether 
political (as in Marx) or general, most general, conscious or 
conceptual ( as in Hegel). Nobody understood this difference better 
than Bataille. And we may think of the word difference here in either 
sense: a difference between two economies of accounting, restricted 
in general, and one between an economy and an operation that it 
wants to account for. The most radical difference announced by 
Bataille as he inscribes the general economy has to do with problema- 
tizing the possibility of an account and economy (as science or 
theory), however conceived.9 This double (at least double) dif- 
ference, therefore, this difference if you like, will affect enormously 
and multiply the shape our "accounting" must take. In these regions 
the category of choice must seem particularly trivial. 10 
Kant's economic considerations imply a fundamental asym- 
metry between two economies at issue. One, "a mercenary employ- 
ment," is the economy of exchange, actual or potential, including, 
but not exclusively, a monetary exchange. We might call it an 
"economic" economy. Another, a "non-economic" economy, the 
economy of the beautiful art and genius, is conceived above all 
through a radical prohibition of exchange. To be rigorous one should 
speak of at least three economies here, for Kant also suggests a pos- 
sibility of an exchange-reward economy at the conceptual level (in the 
domain of understanding) as well, which the economy of the genius of 
the beautiful arts escapes: "and again, though the mind is here 
occupied, it feels itself thus contented and aroused without looking to 
any other purpose (independent of reward)." There is a certain 7
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purpose and reward economy in the occupation (employment) of the 
mind. But such is not the case in the employment classified as beauti- 
ful art. 
This asymmetry is of fundamental significance in Kant, though it 
cannot be sustained on Kant's grounds, as an absolute or funda- 
mental distinction. It is not only that the economy of beautiful art 
cannot be fully liberated from an exchange or reward of some sort. It 
must be factored in, whether we inscribe the economy of the beautiful 
or the economy of beautiful art. It might include, for example, an 
exchange and reward for "the mind . . . occupied" by a play of 
imagination and feeling "thus contented and aroused without looking 
to any other purpose (independently of reward)." As we have seen, 
however, an unconditional insistence of this form of pleasurable 
consumption must in turn be seen as problematic. Conditionally, this 
consumption and this exchange must be taken into account. More sig- 
nificant is the impossibility of an "absolute" reduction of the mer- 
cenary or "economic" economy and employment to a definite stan- 
dard or (paid) reward implied by Kant. As Bataille's analysis of 
expenditure suggests, no economy of any kind can be uncondition- 
ally reduced either to an exchange economy or an economy abso- 
lutely free of exchange. "The Notion of Expenditure," for example, 
powerfully inscribes the structural ( and structuring) supplement of 
exchange. " Indeed, by insisting, in a certain proximity to Nietzsche, 
on the exuberance of "exchange" and expenditure or on the exchange 
of expenditures in that essay, Bataille's text problematizes quite 
radically the concepts of expenditure and waste. Exuberant, the 
operations involved there are always more than simply expenditure, 
more than merely waste. 
It does not mean that such reductions in either direction are not 
found in theoretical practice, including in Bataille, who tends to sub- 
ordinate the effects of exchange and consumption. What Bataille's 
analysis demands, however, is a different inscription of the economic 
and its efficacy. 12 Neither the structures of rewards, including at the 
level of the monetary or political economy, nor the differences 
between these various economies would disappear in this inscription. 
How could they? Rather they must be inscribed otherwise, in effect 
with an increased rigor, necessary precisely in order to account for the 
multiplicity and richness of these differences. For in this enlarged dif- 
ference of inscription one would no longer be able to speak either of 8




one operation or parcel operations categorically in a demarcated 
accountable set. 
The crucial question that poses itself with regard to Bataille is 
whether the difference between restricted and general economy, even 
given the interaction between them, does not retain a kind of Kantian 
(and thus also inescapably Hegelian) trace of absolute difference-a 
trace not sufficiently erased or comprehended by Bataille. For a cer- 
tain trace, given closure, will be unavoidable. This difference con- 
cerns not only an unconditional privilege or priority of expenditure 
over consumption. It could be pointed out in this context that the dif- 
ference and asymmetry so inscribed in Bataille can be seen either 
as the difference between an economy of non-exchange-a non- 
economic economy-and an exchange economy, or as the difference 
between the economy of expenditure and the economy of consump- 
tion. Given Bataille's analysis of exchange (inscribed quite dif- 
ferently, precisely through expenditure) in "The Notion of Expendi- 
ture" and elsewhere, I would see the second possibility, the priority 
and even idealization of waste, as more significant in Bataille's case. 
A most important issue, however, is an unconditional privilege of the 
general economy, however inscribed, or, in general, of any economy 
over any other. 
The labyrinth of this question is enormous and is in the end 
intractable. That is, in the end it cannot be mapped once and for all. 
What I want to do in this paper is rather to articulate the differences 
between Bataille and Kant, whose significance will be undiminished 
whatever the answer and will enable us to inscribe the difference 
(radical enough) from Kant and Hegel. The answer, it might be said, is 
important only with respect to the question of inscribing or situating 
Bataille's "own" text. In general theoretical terms, one might say that 
there is no question here. No economy of any kind might be seen so 
unconditionally privileged. Such is, for now at least (that is, at this 
particular moment in the history of theory and, of course, for specific 
theorists so implied) the law of the economy of the theoretical. 
Such is the constraint of the conditional. But then again, we cannot 
unconditionally separate the question of theory and the question of 
Bataille, particularly the question of situating Bataille's own text 
historically. 
With the qualifications elaborated earlier, the differences 
between Kant and Bataille might be subsumed under two interactive 9
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rubrics: the differences in the inscriptions of the economic operation, 
and the differences in respective sciences or accounts of the opera- 
tion. It is useful to recall Bataille's own formulation of this economic 
problematics in L'Experience interieure before proceeding to an arti- 
culation of these differences: 
The science of relating the object to sovereign moments, in fact, 
is only a general economy which envisages the meaning of these 
objects in relation to each other and finally in relation to the loss 
of meaning. The question of this general economy is situated at 
the level of political economy, but the science designated by this 
name is only a restricted economy (restricted to commercial 
values). In question is the essential problem for the science 
dealing with the use of wealth. The general economy, in the first 
place, makes apparent that excesses of energy are produced, and 
that by definition these excesses cannot be utilized. The exces- 
sive energy can only be lost without the slightest aim, conse- 
quently without any meaning. It is this useless, senseless loss that 
is sovereignty." 
Whatever differences Kant inscribes, first in the aesthetic 
economy (either as the economy of the beautiful or of the sublime), 
and secondly in the economy of the genius of beautiful art, it always 
remains an economy of consumption (as Kant's metaphor taste 
indicates), and, indeed, the economy of pleasurable consumption. 
Furthermore, in the case of the beautiful art, it remains the economy 
of consumption of meaning. For, as we recall, "[the poet] provides in 
this play [of ideas] food for the understanding" (Kant, p. 165). This is 
why one must rigorously insist on the difference between the economy 
of the beautiful and the economy of beautiful art; as the latter includes 
the former, it also exceeds the aesthetic economy of beautiful feeling 
by a philosophical (though still inscribed through consumption) 
dimension of understanding. As Kant maintains, "For beautiful art, 
therefore, imagination, understanding, spirit, and taste are requisite" 
(p. 164). 
As in Aristotle and in the tradition he initiated, after the initial 
demarcation of art by its difference, specifically in affecting feeling 
and the feeling of pleasure, the value of art will be established on the 
basis of philosophical criteria of one type or another. Poetry, for 
example, is more philosophical than history is in Aristotle or than 10




rhetoric is in Kant. An account of this difference still remains within 
the domain and power of the philosophical explanation, and making 
poetry "more philosophical" might be necessary precisely to main- 
tain this parergon, maintain it by identifying the difference that in part 
establishes its boundaries. It can be shown, however, that neither 
Aristotle nor Kant will be able to sustain the boundaries and parer- 
gon at issue. From within their own discourse (this is, of course, what 
makes the configuration so interesting), poetry and art can be shown 
to exceed the containment of the philosophical account in Aristotle 
and Kant. 
The inscription of the philosophical into the poetic is, in Kant, 
non-trivial enough. It should be recalled that Kant's opposition (and 
thus a certain excess) is set between the orator and the poet rather than 
between the philosopher and the poet, as this opposition must be, 
given the philosophical nature of aesthetic value in Kant. The orator, 
of course, also gives more than he promises, just as the poet does; "the 
orator therefore gives something that he does not promise, viz. an 
entertaining play of imagination." There is a difference, however, 
indeed a crucial difference for the orator "also fails to supply what he 
did promise, which is indeed his announced business, viz. the purpo- 
sive occupation of the understanding" (p. 165). That, according 
to Kant's division of intellectual labor, will be supplied by the 
philosopher. The orator thus fails because he in fact entertains, rather 
than conducting "a promised serious business." The poet's 
(announced) entertainment, in contrast, "has the same effect upon the 
understanding, as if he had only intended to carry on its business" 
(p. 165), its serious, that is its philosophical, business. Beautiful art, 
particularly poetry, in contrast to the experience of the beautiful, is 
bound to be philosophical. 
Given these corridors of the economy of taste, Kant's division of 
the beautiful arts that gives poetry priority over rhetoric is inevitable, 
even though both are arts of speech that are related to the mouth, the 
organ of both taste and speech. This priority of voice and the 
hierarchies of arts and senses it entails are exhaustively analyzed by 
Derrida in "Economimesis." It might be further pointed out that the 
poet as discussed in the passage at issue and the genius of the beauti- 
ful art in the third critique in general are inscribed so as to efface in the 
end the material substance produced by the mouth or the phonetic 
substance, to make it disappear in fully internalized play. The imme- 
diate proximity-presence-of "voice" to "mind" finally allows one 11
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to dwell in the absolute presence of mind and ideas. The "speech" and 
"voice" of poetry become thus "the art of mind" similar to the inter- 
nal self-present speech of Husserl's transcendental phenom- 
enology.14 Husserl's dependence on Kant in general is, of course, 
huge. In the context of the present discussion, however, Husserl 
writes in one of his very rare specific references to art: 
It is naturally important, on the other hand (once again as in 
geometry, which has recently and not idly been attaching great 
value to collections of models and the like), to make rich use of 
fancy in that service of perfect clearness which we are here 
demanding, to use it in the free transformation of the data of 
fancy, but previously also to fructify it through the richest and 
best observations possible in primordial intuition; noting, of 
course, that this fructifying does not imply that experience as 
such can be the ground of validity. We can draw extraordinary 
profit from what history has to offer us, and in still richer measure 
from the gifts of art and particularly of poetry. These are indeed 
fruits of imagination, but in respect of the originality of the new 
formations, of the abundance of detailed features, and the 
systematic continuity of the motive forces involved, they greatly 
excel the performances of our own fancy, and moreover, given 
the understanding grasp, pass through the suggestive power of the 
media of artistic presentation with quite special ease into per- 
fectly clear fancies. 
Hence, if anyone loves a paradox, he can really say, and say 
with strict truth if he will allow for the ambiguity, that the ele- 
ment which makes up the life of phenomenology as of all 
eidetical science is 'fiction, "that fiction is the source whence the 
knowledge of "eternal truths" draws its sustenance. " 
As the foregoing discussion would suggest, the presence of Kant here 
is mighty. The insistence on poetry is particularly revealing, though it 
is also necessary, given the privileged role of voice and phonetic sub- 
stance in their immediate proximity to mind, the "voice that keeps 
silence," in Husserl. What is most interesting, however, is the ques- 
tion of profit or even extraordinary profit in Husserl's formulation. 
The philosopher "can draw extraordinary profit from what history 
has to offer [him], and in still richer measure from the gifts of art and 
particularly of poetry" (p. 184). The philosopher's desire to consume 12




and to take full economic advantage of both history and art (particu- 
larly poetry) is irrepressible. But it is the consumptive desire-the 
appetite of the philosopher-that would inscribe the philosophical 
into the arts in the first place in order to make it ready for philosophical 
consumption. 
Here we might expect a burst of laughter from Bataille. First of 
all, the surrealistic Bataille would laugh at the possibility of pleasure 
and of the pleasure of consumption without displeasure or even 
without disgust-taste without dis-taste, gout without degofit. It 
should be pointed out at this juncture that, as Derrida shows in 
"Economimesis," it is not that the economy of dis-gust goes unnoticed 
or is discounted. It is philosophically accounted for, but is not on that 
account part of the economy of taste. In a singularly bad theoretical 
taste it is accounted for precisely as dis-gust, dis-taste, as what does 
not belong. A more significant issue however, in Bataille's context, is 
the more general conceptual or metaphoric structure of the Kantian 
economy and Kantian economimesis as economy and mimesis of 
consumption. It is this, whether in Kant or Hegel, that would be 
unacceptable or laughable to Bataille. "Waste and taste" might 
occupy separate compartments in the corridors of dialectic or 
philosophy in general, but they are ultimately and intimately related 
in the labyrinths of the general economy. That would also refer to the 
general economy of Bataille's own life, where the inscription of 
production-philosophical, sociological, artistic or other-must have 
been multiply related by Bataille himself to the economy of waste, 
including the inscription of the difference between consummation and 
consumption and to the unreserved expenditure of tuberculosis, 
Bataille's disease, consomption, that consumes-that is, wastes- 
without the slightest aim, consequently without any meaning. 
It must be kept in mind, however, that the general economy-as 
the economy of loss, waste, expenditure without reserve, and so on- 
and the operations it aims to account for cannot be reduced to 
the economy of disgust exemplified by Derrida's analysis in 
"Economimesis" of "disgust" and "vomiting" in Kant. The loss and 
expenditure enacted by Bataille's sovereign operation and inscribed 
in the general economy as the science of sovereignty are enormously 
rich and complex structures. Their inscription includes, for example, 
the conceptions of "gift" and "sacrifice" (analyzed at great length by 
Bataille) and a formidable array of other structures that must be con- 
sidered with utmost rigor and precision. 13
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"Vomiting," however, remains important in the context of 
general economy as an exemplification of the absolute dis-gust, some- 
thing that cannot be consumed, has to be "thrown up." Or must it be? 
Certainly by definition, it cannot be in Kant; this is Derrida's major 
point in "Economimesis." In general, however, in the general 
economy, things are not so simple or restricted, threatening the whole 
Kantian or the philosophical scheme of taste, and in every sense 
conceivable making the issue into a labyrinth-maze-populated 
with all sorts of monsters. The question of vomiting has, of course, its 
place in Bataille, a very definite place in a memorable quotation from 
Sade in a great and important essay, entitled, quite pertinently, "The 
Use Value of D. A. F. de Sade." As Bataille writes, quoting Sade: 
The process of simple appropriation is normally presented within 
the process of composite excretion, insofar as it is necessary for 
the production of an alternating rhythm, for example, in the 
following passage from Sade: "Verneiul makes someone shit, he 
eats the turd, and then he demands that someone eats his. The 
one who eats his shit vomits; he devours her puke. ( Visions p. 95) 
The pleasures 
might be seen as monstrous enough, but they must be accounted for as 
what Derrida calls in "Signature Event Context" "a structural 
possibility," even if they would occur only once, and they have, in 
fact, certainly occurred more than once. In a certain sense, they occur 
all the time; not necessarily in the specific shape described by Sade, 
but as analogous effects of the general economy of "taste" that 
must incorporate "dis-taste" and "dis-gust" as its ineluctable 
constituent. 
As Derrida shows it is only in the Kantian economy of taste as an 
economy of pleasurable consumption that the question of vomiting 
and disgust must acquire and be philosophically accounted for as 
having a unique position, from which the whole scheme might thus be 
deconstructed. This special position precisely allows and invites a 
critical scrutiny and deconstruction. Once such a deconstruction is 
performed and the economy of taste is re-inscribed as the general 
economy, "vomiting" and "disgust" become regular effects of this 
enriched economy, though they might under certain conditions have 
asymmetrical relations and be subordinated by the effects of taste and 
consumption. 14




By the same token the general economy cannot be seen as only 
the economy of loss, waste, unreserved expenditure and so on. It can 
never be unconditionally separated from the restricted economy in the 
first place. Both "taste" and "disgust" are in fact still restricted effects 
of the complex labyrinth of the general economy; this, perhaps, was 
also Derrida's point in "Economimesis." Bataille, in the essay at 
issue, in inscribing this complexity, brilliantly relates Sade's passage 
to the question of sacrifice, communion, gift, general expenditure, and 
so forth, thus establishing the affects of disgust precisely as a 
manifestation, however extreme, of the general rather than of the 
exclusive, as philosophy would want to do. 
It is because philosophy or traditional theory have throughout 
their history (with some notable exceptions, such as Sade or 
Nietzsche) suppressed and/or repressed the economy of expenditure 
that the expenditure must be brought into the foreground, but not 
because it has the absolute privilege over the economy of consump- 
tion. The latter economy (as science) must now be made general as 
well, that is, to take into account (or dis-count) and reinscribe a 
consumption and production as an effect of expenditure and 
unreserved expenditure. Since the restricted economy manifests 
itself, above all, at the level of the political economy, these conse- 
quences and implications are the value (it can no longer quite be 
called the use-value) of D. A. F. de Sade, the value brilliantly 
exposed in Bataille's "Open Letter to My Current Comrades," as his 
essay is subtitled. The political economy as the economy of the 
political must take the effects inscribed by de Sade into considera- 
tion, not an "account" perhaps. 
Conversely, the economy of the sexual must take into account the 
effects and the very economy of the political. The relationships 
between these two economies should not be seen as always 
necessarily symmetrical. To begin with, there are more than two 
economies involved here. The hypothesis that such economies form a 
countable set is hardly tenable, though there will certainly be multi- 
ple "set-effects" in our economic calculations, in our calculus and our 
accounting, of these interactions. 
Derrida's extraordinary analysis of Kant in "Economimesis" 
depends fundamentally on Bataille's conceptions. It opens by intro- 
ducing (in Bataille's sense) the concept of "economimesis" in the con- 
text of relationships between the restricted and general economies, or 
rather referring to Bataille's terms from infinitesimal to radical, 15
Plotnitsky: The Maze of Taste: On Bataille, Derrida, and Kant
Published by New Prairie Press
214 STCL, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Summer, 1988) 
including (as in the case of the difference between Derrida's dif- 
ferance and Hegel's Aufhebung) both at once. 16 As Derrida writes: 
It would appear that mimesis and oikonomia could have nothing 
to do with one another. The point is to demonstrate the contrary, 
to exhibit the systematic link between the two; but not between 
some particular political economy and mimesis, for the latter can 
accommodate itself to political systems that are different, even 
opposed to one another. And we are not yet defining economy as 
an economy of circulation (a restricted economy) or a general 
economy, for the whole difficulty is narrowed down here as soon 
as-that is the hypothesis-there is no possible opposition 
between these two economies. Their relation must be one neither 
of identity nor of contradiction but must be other. (pp. 3-4) 
The two sections into which Derrida divides his essay-"Production 
as Mimesis" and "Exemporality"-might be seen as demarcating the 
problems involved along two lines or rubrics indicated earlier. The 
first section explores the nature or the structure of the operation, 
inscribing the economy of mimesis as a mimesis of the economy. The 
second could be seen as a critique of an attempt at the philosophical, 
conceptual account of both the economy of the beautiful and the 
economy of beautiful art. These two economies, as we recall, remain 
interactive in Kant, but their difference is also rigorously maintained 
in the third critique. Since I have considered the structure of the 
economic operation and the role of the difference between consump- 
tion and expenditure in some detail earlier, I would like to conclude 
with some remarks on the nature of the account, that is to say, pre- 
cisely with the question of the general economy as science in Derrida 
and Bataille. It must still be kept in mind that these two issues- 
"operation" and "its science"-remain in a complex interaction as 
indicated earlier. 
Derrida, in his account of the Kantian or even philosophical in 
general, seems in the essay at issue to stress the "desire" of the system 
to account for its other, specifically the system of the beautiful for the 
(absolute) dis-gust. The issue, clearly enough, is more general. It is 
the issue and account of the other of the system. The other, as the term 
and concept of the other, is in fact already an account of the other, and 
"vomit" takes in Kant a specific, privileged role in this configuration. 
As Derrida writes at the conclusion of "Economimesis": 16




Disgust is not the symmetrical inverse of taste, the negative key 
to the system, except insofar as some interest sustains its 
excellence, like that of the mouth itself-the chemistry of the 
word-and prohibits the substitution of any non-oral analogue. 
The system therefore is interested in determining the other as its 
other, that is, as literary disgust. 
What is absolutely foreclosed is not vomit, but the 
possibility of a vicariousness of vomit, of its replacement by 
anything else-by some other unrepresentable, unnameable, 
unintelligible, insensible, unassimilable, obscene other which 
forces enjoyment and whose irrepressible violence would undo 
the hierarchizing authority of logocentric analogy-its power of 
identification. . . . 
The word vomit arrests the vicariousness of disgust; it puts 
the thing in the mouth; it substitutes; but only, for example, oral 
for anal. It is determined by the system of the beautiful, "the 
symbol of morality," as its other. It is then for philosophy, still, an 
elixir, even in the quintessence of its bad taste. (p. 25; emphasis 
on "anal" added) 
We have in Bataille's 
inscription of the interplay between consumption and expenditure, 
including the substitution, not by analogy only; of oral for anal. Both 
Bataille and Derrida make quite apparent the folly and "naïveté" of 
this powerful and irrepressible desire to exclude. The latter is itself a 
gesture of rejection and not consumption; a rejected (repressed) rejec- 
tion makes its powerful return, the return of the repressed into the 
structure of the philosophical that is, consumptive) account. Derrida 
thus inserts in the passage just cited: 
Vicariousness would in turn be reassuring only if it substi- 
tuted an identifiable term for an unrepresentable one, if it allowed 
one to step aside from the abyss in the direction of another place, 
if it were interested in some other go-around [s'interesse 
quelque mange] . But for that it would have to be itself and repre- 
sent itself as such. Whereas it is starting from that impossibility 
that economimesis is constrained in its processes. 
This impossibility cannot be said to be some thing, some- 
thing sensible or intelligible, that could fall under one or the other 
senses or under some concept. One cannot name it within the 17
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logocentric system-within the name-which in turn can only 
vomit it and vomit itself in it. One cannot even say: what is it? 
That would be to begin to eat it, or-what is no longer absolutely 
different-to vomit it. The question what is? already parleys 
[arraisonne] like a parergon, it constructs a framework which 
captures the energy of what is complete inassimilable and abso- 
lutely repressed. Any philosophical question already deter- 
mines, concerning this other, a paregoric parergon. A paregoric 
remedy softens with speech; it consoles, it exhorts with the word. 
As its name indicates. (p. 25) 
This question of the excluded (the most general logic of philosophy, 
perhaps logic itself) and paregoric remedy of parergon would, how- 
ever, constitute only a part, however indispensable and however 
structuring, of the inscription of the general economy as science, in 
both Derrida and Bataille. Bataille's greatest laughter comes as he 
looks at the naïveté of the philosopher accounting for beautiful art. 
The very term beautiful would be laughable enough. Bataille's 
laughter would in fact be most "logical" here. The philosophical (con- 
scious and conceptual) accounts and the science of philosophy (such 
as Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind, subtitled "The Science 
[Wissenschaft] of the Experience of Consciousness") are, by defini- 
tion, consumptive, and thus remain a restricted economy. As Derrida 
notes in "From Restricted to General Economy," such a restricted 
philosophical economy would "pleasurably consume an absolutely 
close presence" (Writing and Difference, p. 273). 
The philosopher, it is true, often "forgets" this pleasure of the 
conceptual consumption and conceptual mastery. The "forgetting" 
may take the form of either unconscious repressing or conscious 
concealment or various combinations of both) of the knowledge of this 
pleasure. It has been around ever since Socrates based the difference 
between and opposition of philosophy and literature on the difference 
and opposition between truth and pleasure. Once the philosophical 
discourse "pleasurably consumes," however, would not the 
framing-the parergon-that divides the philosophical and the 
literary or artistic be threatened in its very core? This parergon also 
fundamentally divides that which accounts (namely, philosophy), and 
the experience of the beautiful and beautiful art, that are accounted for 
by a philosopher. Derrida's analysis of Kant in "Economimesis" and 
La verite en peinture suggests at least that much. Cannot, then, the 18




third critique, an account that pleasurably consumes, be itself read as 
an aesthetic experience or as a work of beautiful art? The latter parer- 
gon is already to some extent violated in Kant's own text, as it is in 
Aristotle, by establishing the fundamentally philosophical value of 
the beautiful art of the highest rank, poetry. The parergonal violation 
inscribed in the questions just asked is of a more radical, more violent 
and, in theoretical terms, more fundamental nature. 
First of all, the economy of such an "aesthetic" account, an 
account as beautiful art, must, according to both Bataille and Derrida, 
exceed the economy of consumption, that is, the restricted economy 
to which both philosophy and beautiful art conform in Kant. It is pre- 
cisely a belief, a "naive" or "vulgar" (that is to say "philosophical") 
belief, in the possibility of the utilization of all intellectual energy that 
Bataille laughs at. For the philosopher can only believe or claim 
to take everything into his account or into his dis-count, but not 
"actually" do so. The economy of every account-literary, philo- 
sophical or other-is always already a general economy. 
Still more significant is the question of the law or the style of a 
discourse in the general economy and of major writing. It would be 
most naive or vulgar to reverse the configuration-to reverse the 
parergon-and replace philosophy or theory, make literature or the 
"beautiful art" into a unique or ultimate genre of general economy. 
The latter, as we recall, still remains a science, though, to be sure, in 
neither a Hegelian nor a positivist sense; it is not a "positive science." 
But it must retain a scientific rigor in its discourse. Like Nietzsche, 
Bataille practiced a plural style and plural genre in his own discourse, 
making it both literary (in his novels or poetry) and theoretical (in his 
essays). But he also attempted something else in his activities related 
to the College de Sociologie. One must then speak of at least three 
genres for enacting a general economy of discourse and major form of 
writing. It must be pointed out that one must be rather cautious in 
relating the general economy and major writing in Bataille. Bataille, 
let us further recall, was also a librarian and the founder and editor of 
the journal Critique. Since in all of these "genres" or "styles," the 
social or general political economy are heavily involved, what is most 
at stake (en jeu) in the question of general economy is the law and the 
style of the social and institutional forms of our accounts. And this 
law and this style, or this genre, cannot (and in practice should not) be 
established once and for all, though some claim to have done so. As 
Derrida writes, "referring to the entire French landscape" (in 19
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1968), where Bataille is inescapably present: "What we need, per- 
haps, as Nietzsche said, is a change of `style'; and if there is style, 
Nietzsche reminded us, it must be plural" (Margins, p. 135). 
Bataille, however, in Derrida's own words, "considered himself 
closer to Nietzsche than anyone else, to the point of identification with 
him" ( Writing and Difference, p. 251), most of all, in the force of the 
impact, in the radical transformation of the "theoretical" or "literary" 
style, in making it plural. It is the maze of style and the style of a maze. 
"NIETZSCHE'S DOCTRINE CANNOT BE ENSLAVED. It 
can only be followed" (Visions, p. 184), a thought and style- 
writing-that must be entered like a labyrinth. In a brilliant little 
chapter "Nietzsche/Theseus" of "The Obelisk", Bataille, anticipat- 
ing much of deconstruction, invokes "a derisive and enigmatic figure 
placed at the entrance of the labyrinth" and speaks of "the founda- 
tion of things that has fallen into a bottomless void. And what is fear- 
lessly assented to no longer in a duel where the death of the hero is 
risked against that of the monster, in exchange for an indifferent 
duration-is not an isolated creature; it is the very void and ver- 
tiginous fall, it is TIME" ( Visions, p. 222). No wonder that Kant, in 
contemplating the beautiful, prefers tulips in the garden to the ver- 
tiginous and even nauseating experience of the labyrinth. We must 
say, in all fairness to Kant, that he approaches some of this ver- 
tiginous experience in his analysis of the sublime, and thus can be seen 
as a precursor of both Nietzsche and Bataille (as well as Sade) in this 
respect. But then the whole opposition between the beautiful (the one 
that is framed, in a parergon) and the sublime (the one-"absolutely 
great"-that exceeds all parerga) collapses. It is also a collapse of the 
philosophical style. 
It is not that in so recognizing Bataille's enormous contribution 
one would want to claim for Bataille, or Nietzsche, or indeed anyone, 
a unique significance in this transformation of the theoretical field. 
Rather, in an account that, in an absence of a better word might still 
be termed "historical," one would want to explore in a stratified 
ensemble-from Kant and Hegel, to Nietzsche, Bataille and 
Derrida-what has made and still makes possible the radical trans- 
formations of the field, the transformations that make the field plural. 
And in thinking of the theorists and practitioners of the plural style, 
one will have to refer to a landscape that can no longer be demarcated 
as either French or German, however important these two landscapes 
might be. Like style, if there is landscape, it must be plural. 20
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